shall, in this brief paper, discuss what happened to the economy and to the economic forecasters in that bleak year. In the comments addressed to forecasting, I shall not allocate blame or praise; my purpose rather is to raise some questions and infer some lessons that may be relevant for future research and application.
Of course, in line with standard theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence, a dip (or even slowdown) of real income does not normally have an immediate proportionate effect on consumer expenditure. Hence, a drop in the saving rate is to be expected when income sags. In that sense, the unchanged (as well as historically high) saving rate of 1974 is a mark of unusual weakness in consumer demand. But, in fact, the saving rate has not displayed any distinct countercyclical pattern during recessions in the postwar era. The share of disposable income spent on nondurables and services has typically risen (as it did in 1974); but the share spent on durables has invariably declined, sometimes dominating the aggregate consumptionincome ratio.
In retrospect, it is not at all difficult to account for historically low consumption in relation to disposable income during 1974. In line with past experience, accelerating (unanticipated) inflation may have depressed consumer demand.2 Another contributor may have been the sharp decline in To be sure, the bumpy quarterly pattern of consumer demand during 1974 can be explained only in terms of special and transitory influences like the unavailability of gasoline in the first quarter, the way the announcement of major price increases slated for the 1975 automobile models helped to sell 1974 cars during the third quarter, and the way that temporary rebound in automobile demand itself weakened the fourth-quarter performance. Nonetheless, for the year as a whole, the behavior of consumption was not much of a mystery, given the decline in real disposable income. Federal Reserve, holding M1 right on track during the spring quarter, did not accommodate.
The spurt in short-term interest rates from March to July made inevitable the second-half plunge in homebuilding and mobile homes. After midyear, the Federal Reserve shifted from a quantity-oriented monetary policy to a rate-oriented strategy, and allowed the money stock to sag below the previous track, as credit demands waned. While it had tolerated an abrupt rise in interest rates during the spring, it cushioned the decline in rates during the fall and winter. If the Federal Reserve had maintained its quantityoriented policy after midyear, it might have sped the turnaround in the credit-sensitive areas by several months, but it could no longer have prevented the housing collapse of the second half.
While the impact of high interest rates on residential construction and mobile homes is obvious, any major prompt influence of those rates on other components of expenditure (consumer durables other than mobile homes, inventory investment, and plant and equipment) is not visible to the naked eye-at least not to mine. 
PRE-EMBARGO
The first round of forecasts for 1974, prior to the imposition of the oil embargo in October, revealed a broad consensus that the year would experience moderate increases in real output (2 to 3 percent), some modest uptrend in unemployment, and a distinct slowing of inflation (to roughly 5 percent). (The median forecast of a sizable sample that reports quarterly is shown in table 3.) As James Duesenberry characterized this consensus in With the embargo and explosion in oil prices, the basic premises of that initial forecast suddenly became obsolete. From the point of view of a macroeconomist, an event like the quadrupling of oil prices by the cartel is fundamentally exogenous. If improvements are to be made in appraising the likelihood of such major disturbances, the assignment will have to be undertaken by foreign policy and commodity experts, rather than mere GNP-men. Even in the absence of the oil crisis, overall prices in 1974 would probably have risen distinctly more and output somewhat less than in the pattern envisioned by the forecasters. Nonetheless, their basic scenario of a nonrecessionary slowdown might well have been realized had it not been for the oil shock.
TURN OF THE YEAR
The forecasts made at the turn of the year cranked in some impact from the petroleum developments and some lessons from continued bad news on inflation. The consensus remained fairly broad as it shifted toward more inflation and less real growth. The typical January-February forecast for 1974 had the following characteristics:
1. Nominal GNP was expected to grow by about $100 billion, or nearly 8 percent.
2. Real GNP was expected to rise only a fraction of 1 percent, and prices were marked up some 7 percent.
3. The expected quarterly pattern of real GNP was in the shape of a saucer, with the first quarter generally pegged down, and the final quarter up; disagreements on the sign of movements focused on the two middle quarters, but they were expected to register only small changes, whether plus or minus.
The true magnitude and significance of the increases in oil prices were still not apparent. In January, the price of imported oil was not expected to exceed $8 a barrel; it ultimately rose above $12. The Council of Economic Advisers noted that the price rise through December 1973, when applied to the volume of imports of 1973, would amount to "less than 1 percent" of GNP, and labeled this calculation as "probably an outside estimate of the The weakened demand for automobiles had become apparent, and was the key element in the accurate forecast of a decline in real output for 1974:1. A few forecasters expected major losses in the nation's productive capability as a result of the scarcity of oil, but the majority correctly anticipated no serious supply impact from the embargo. Generally, some explicit assumption-most often, "near midyear"-was made about the termination of the embargo. That event was expected to aid the rebound in the second half, particularly by promoting recovery of automobile demand. A few economists called attention to the drain that the "oil tax" inflicted on real consumer income, quite apart from the embargo, but many ignored it. Continuing strength in plant and equipment spending and a rebound in housing were expected regardless of the oil situation.
The expected rebound in housing was linked to a dip of interest rates to levels that would restore thrift inflows. Interest rates were, in fact, falling at the turn of the year; but, as Tobin pointed out,9 it was hard to reconcile the prediction of continued declines with the prevailing expectations of 8 percent growth of nominal GNP, on the one hand, and 51/2 or 6 percent growth of the money stock, on the other.
Another bullish element was the expected strength of inventory investment. That prediction was seriously biased upward by the original Commerce Department underestimate of inventory investment in 1973. Initially, inventory investment for 1973:4 was pegged at $15.9 billion (annual rate), in contrast to the current estimate of $28.9 billion for the period; that for the entire year 1973 was initially put at $7.4 billion, in contrast to the present $15.4 billion. The forecasters were told that the shelves were bare, and expected them to be restocked.
The forecasters were also misled about the prospects for federal expenditures in the first half of 1974. Actual expenditures on the national income and product basis during fiscal 1974 ran $7 billion below the projection in the budget document of February 1974. While $2 billion of that total reflected an accounting change (involving a complex transaction with India), the remaining $5 billion-$10 billion at annual rates during the first half of 1974-did make a substantial difference.
Because the large errors on the price level and output were offsetting, the prediction of nominal GNP turned out to be accurate. In fact, the GNP deflator rose 10.3 percent while output fell 2.1 percent, yielding the same 8 By spring, the forecasters had to digest disappointing news on both prices and output for the first quarter. On the other hand, as of March 18, the lifting of the embargo became a fact and not merely a working assumption. Moreover, after a weak interval in January and February, industrial production and private employment leveled off. While the forecasters scaled down projected levels of real activity throughout 1974 and in May the median forecast called for a tiny decline of real GNP from 1973 to 1974, a cumulative decline in economic activity seemed to most a less serious threat than it had at the turn of the year. The predicted annual increase in the deflator was marked up into the 8 to 9 percent range, but inflation as well as output was expected to look better in the second half. The script was much the same as at the beginning of the year: continued gains in plant and equipment spending, a recovery in housing, a rebound in consumer durables (which played a larger role than it had in the turn-of-the-year forecasts), and less inflation in commodities (including oil).
10. Alternatively, it can be argued that, with monetary conditions so tight during 1974, the money stock exerted more influence on nominal GNP than it had in 1973 or even in 1969; thus inflation led to less upward adjustment of the velocity of money and more downward adjustment of real output.
SUMMER
In July, the forecasters got a new view of the inventory situation from the Department of Commerce. That revision raised a few doubts-but only a few-about the outlook for continuing strength in inventory investment. Although short-term interest rates were now soaring to unprecedented levels, the median expectation on housing starts in the ASA-NBER survey of forecasters in August was a plateau of 1.5 million units during the second half. At that point, most gave up on a second-half rebound of real GNP, projecting instead an essentially flat pattern. Still, they were prepared to bet 2 to 1 against a decline in real GNP in the fourth quarter and nearly 3 to 1 against such a decline for the first quarter of 1975. Again, they expected imminent improvement in inflation (in part, counting on good crops and hence falling farm prices) and an emerging recovery in the market for consumer durables (perhaps extrapolating the higher rate of car sales in the summer).
In light of subsequent developments in the economy and in fiscal policy, the administration's restrictive fiscal program of October 8 must be rated as the most misconceived stabilization package of the past generation. But, at least by some tastes on the output-inflation tradeoff, it was not unreasonable against the background of the typical forecast then prevailing.
The Lessons of 1974
The serious errors in appraising the 1974 outlook cannot be tied to any particularly defective forecasting theory or technique. Indeed, the striking fact is the basic agreement of most of the quantitative forecasters, whether Keynesians or monetarists, builders of large econometric models, devotees of leading indicators, or gazers into crystal balls. The tendency toward agreement may reflect the incentive system operating on forecasters: the costs in income and status of being wrong when alone must be far higher than the costs of being wrong in good company.
It is as easy to be wise in retrospect as it is difficult to be right in prospect. Yet a number of clues that became evident along the way pointed to a different assessment of the outlook and indeed were so interpreted by a few observers. First, by January or February, some economists appraised the impact of the oil crisis fairly accurately and adjusted their projections of real consumption downward to reflect the dent of the "oil tax" on real disposable income. Unfortunately, in the minds of many forecasters, the embargo apparently "excused" the setbacks in the early months of 1974 and thus masked the basic weakness of the economy. In addition, only a few forecasters expressed concern that unanticipated inflation might depress consumer demand.
Second, at least by midyear, there were good reasons to expect some weakening of employment demand in relation to output. The minority who foresaw layoffs and rising unemployment expressed doubts about the belief-maintained so wrongly by so many for so long-that the consumer would come back to market.
Third, by spring, a few economists were raising questions about the impact on inflation of the end of wage and price controls on April 30. And the less optimistic forecasts of inflation were accompanied by greater concern about tight money and adverse consumer attitudes.
Fourth, by late spring, when interest rates were soaring and funds once again began to flow out of thrift institutions, an imminent decline in homebuilding should have been foreseen. At least, the widespread belief in a "floor" on starts of 1.5 million units should have been subjected to closer scrutiny.
Fifth, a few-but very few-monetarists viewed the declining real money stock in the first half of 1974 as a danger to real activity. If M1 had been growing at a zero rate with inflation at 4 percent, monetarists would generally have been very bearish about real GNP. It is not clear why 6 percent M1 growth and 10 percent inflation did not make them equivalently bearish.
Sixth, the growing excess of inventories should have been diagnosed as final sales remained (and were expected to remain) far below their previous peak. The forecasters were betting against a regularity of postwar history in expecting no inventory liquidation. Particularly after the July statistical revisions, major markdowns of projected inventory investment were in order. Although such markdowns would have worsened the accuracy of inventory forecasts for the second half (when stocks piled up involuntarily), they would have dramatically improved the forecasts of real GNP.
Even the possibility of a traditional, typical inventory (and employment) cycle was widely dismissed until it roared into reality at the end of 1974. Many forecasters seemed to regard the business cycle as obsolete. For four-teen years, the economy had escaped liquidation of inventories and significant reduction of work forces. The samples of data incorporated in equations and memories alike were heavily weighted with observations from a period of unusual stability in real economic activity. In this connection, what many of the forecasters missed was not something new but something old: multiplier-accelerator interactions and other cumulative cyclical processes. In days of yore, these were deeply imprinted in the profession's thinking-from the experience of the fifties; the time-series analysis of Arthur Burns, Wesley Mitchell, and others at the National Bureau of Economic Research; the inventory-cycle models of Lloyd Metzler; and the general multiplier-accelerator analysis of Paul Samuelson. Those old tracts could have helped to keep the forecasters on the right track.
The discussion of this report is combined with that of the Perry report which follows.
